INTERVIEW - "Trump is currently dismantling the entire American constitutional order," says Francis Fukuyama

He is arguably the world's most well-known political scientist and, at 72, remains a staunch defender of liberal democracy. The NZZ met Francis Fukuyama in the lobby of his hotel in Zurich, where he was appearing at a literature festival.

Mr. Fukuyama, in 1989 you wrote your famous essay "The End of History." Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many have proclaimed the return of history. Is it back?

In an obvious sense, yes. In 1989, we were in the midst of a long phase of global democratization, which culminated in the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Now this development has reversed. In this sense, we are back in a world of geopolitics and power.

In your essay, you argued that with liberal democracy, humanity has reached its highest form of government. Putin and Xi Jinping probably see things differently.

Whether there is actually a form of government that is better for citizens is a normative debate. I still see no alternative. Nor do I believe anyone considers the Russian form of government to be the ideal form of political organization. It is a dictatorship that denies civil rights and wages bloody, senseless wars. A more plausible alternative would be China, a country that has been successful in fostering high-tech economic growth. But even in China's case, I believe there will be long-term weaknesses because the country concentrates decision-making in the hands of one person. I also believe that many Chinese would prefer to live in a society with more freedom.

Nevertheless, something has changed in recent years. The BRICS countries form a kind of illiberal bloc that is even larger economically than the West.

This bloc exists. But I don't think it's driven by any overarching idea other than a resentment toward Western power. India, for example, remains a democracy after all. Brazil, for its part, is even a relatively healthy democracy that simply has reasons to dislike the United States. The Global South is disintegrating into many different kinds of political systems and offers no alternative way of organizing society. I think if you're looking for a more serious critique of my thesis, it has to do with the United States.

Do you see the greatest threat to liberal democracy in the USA?

Trump, I believe, is a truly authoritarian president who is actually in the process of dismantling the entire American constitutional order.

You're not a fan of Trump. Several well-known intellectuals have already left the country. Do you also plan to emigrate?

No.

Do you assume that Trump will simply be democratically voted out of office?

I would be very surprised if the Democrats don't at least recapture the House of Representatives in next year's elections. Some of his policies, particularly the tariffs, will have a very negative impact on the economy. Average Americans will feel the brunt of that. Also, Trump just passed this absurd budget bill that allocates about $170 billion to create a new national police force to deport people. So he's in the process of creating a police state. I don't think that will be popular. People want the southern border patrolled. They don't want a police state.

Why has liberal democracy come under such pressure, not only in the USA?

Liberal societies lack a powerful, shared source of identity based on, say, religion, ethnicity, or national affiliation. I don't think such an identity is even possible in the modern world. Societies are far too pluralistic for that. Take a country like India: Prime Minister Modi may be trying to base India's national identity on Hinduism, but that leaves out a quarter of a billion people who are not Hindus. Successful liberal societies are those that have an active civil society in which people band together on the basis of religion or some other shared passion. The caveat is that they don't impose that passion on others. A liberal society requires tolerance for different views of the good life.

Why are we less and less able to do this in the Western world?

There are several factors. One is technological development. The rise of the internet has, in many ways, undermined a kind of common ground for simple empirical knowledge. For example, Donald Trump can simply claim that the 2020 election was stolen from him, and thanks to the internet, he can convince maybe 30 to 40 percent of the American population of that. I don't think that would have been possible 20 or 30 years ago. Back then, the elite had greater control over what people understood as facts. Added to that are some misinterpretations of liberalism that have caused a backlash.

What for example?

On the right, there's so-called neoliberalism, a kind of extreme application of the market economy that has increased inequality within countries. On the other hand, there's identity politics, which abandons the liberal principle of equal dignity for all and instead divides people into groups based on ethnicity or gender. This anti-liberal idea has provoked a backlash from white people in the United States, for example.

Liberal societies and liberal democracies have always been closely linked to liberal markets. But the hope for "change through trade" has not panned out. Why?

First of all, the type of liberalization pursued in the 1990s and 2000s led to a high degree of inequality. After China joined the WTO in the early 2000s, approximately two to three million American workers became unemployed. Globally, the economy grew, but the American working class suffered greatly. Furthermore, the liberalization of financial markets was a major mistake. What happened to the American working class directly led to the backlash surrounding Trump's election in 2016.

What is more important in this backlash: the loss of common identity or economic inequality?

This is something we've been debating for many years. But the two are connected. When you lose your job, you also lose a lot of your dignity. If you're a coal miner in West Virginia whose father and grandfather were miners and made good money, and you suddenly don't have a job, that means not only economic deprivation but also a loss of social status. And that, in turn, has led to a lot of social dysfunction. For example, drug use has risen sharply among this population. And there's another big problem that we're only now beginning to recognize.

Which?

The gender divide. The changes that have occurred as a result of economic change have particularly harmed the position of young men. My probably least-read book, "The Great Disruption," was published in 1999 under the title "The Great Disruption." The main argument was that the transition from an industrial to an information economy would have a major impact on the workforce, particularly on the empowerment of the hundreds of millions of women who have entered the labor market in industrialized countries since the late 1960s. Especially at the lower levels of education, women perform significantly better than men. Many young men see no future for themselves, and this has consequences. Right-wing candidates are more likely to respond to the resentment of young men, who are finding it increasingly difficult to gain recognition and respect.

What can be done about it?

That's the big question. This gender shift will affect every society. It's happening in China right now, too. One of China's major problems is the fact that it produces tens of millions of college graduates every year, yet the unemployment rate among young college graduates is 20 percent. The Chinese government has even stopped publishing the statistics because they are so poor. So it's not as if authoritarian governments have an answer to these questions. Now we are once again facing massive change, triggered by artificial intelligence. We don't know how we will adapt to the social, political, and labor market changes.

You wrote "The End of History" in a time of hope, a moment of optimism. Today, people are much more pessimistic. Can liberalism survive without optimism?

We'll see. But one thing is clear: liberalism isn't a machine that runs on its own. If people don't believe in it and don't fight for it, it won't survive. But I believe there are many such struggles in the world. Just look at Ukraine. The Ukrainians' commitment to liberalism is truly extraordinary. They have endured incredible suffering to defend their independence and their freedoms.

You also wrote back then that you felt a strong longing for the time when history still existed. Would you phrase it that way again?

I think everyone feels that yearning. After October 7, every American campus was overrun by pro-Palestinian protesters. Why this issue in particular? It's because they don't have social justice issues to address in their own society, yet they want to fight on someone's behalf. So it's about filling a kind of void that's created when you have a very successful, safe, democratic society. People still want to fight, and so they'll fight for any cause that comes their way.

Does this mean that liberal democracy will always remain unstable?

That's the argument I made in my first book. People never read the last five chapters of "The End of History and the Last Man." At one point, it says: If people live in a successful democracy that is peaceful and stable, and they have no opportunity to fight for democracy, then eventually they will fight against democracy. And I think that's what we're seeing right now.

Francis Fukuyama will read from his new book “Liberalism and Its Enemies” at the Zurich Literature Festival on Friday, July 11.