Reason of state or international law: Germany needs a new culture of remembrance

When the Jewish-American literary scholar Stefanie Engelstein defended the legitimacy of the slogan "Free Palestine from German Guilt" at an event in Germany a few weeks ago, she encountered considerable incomprehension. However, her intervention touched on a central point in current German discourse: What lessons can be learned from Nazi crimes for the present, and how do these lessons shape perceptions of the war in Gaza? Engelstein argued that German remembrance culture, in its current form, leads to an extremely selective perspective that prevents a fair and nuanced view of current events. In light of political communication and media coverage, the question arises whether this finding is inaccurate and whether Engelstein is right.

This is clearly evident in Germany's foreign policy stance. While 28 states called for an immediate end to the Gaza war and criticized the Israeli government in a joint statement, Germany once again held back. It quickly invokes its so-called historical responsibility toward Israel and its self-imposed raison d'état. But what if this raison d'état contradicts international law? After all, international law, too, is a lesson learned from the Second World War, a consequence of the Holocaust and the crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi regime.

Especially in recent weeks, when Germany has taken such a weak stance on the work of the International Criminal Court—an institution founded precisely because of Germany's history—many lawyers have asked: What matters more? Reason of state or international law? What is the true historical responsibility?

While many try to reconcile the two, I advocate a fundamental paradigm shift: Germany does not bear a historical responsibility for a state. Germany bears a historical responsibility for upholding human rights and adhering to international law.

The Holocaust was one of the greatest crimes against humanity in history. Millions of Jews were systematically murdered. But not only them: Sinti and Roma, people with disabilities, and Slavic population groups were also persecuted. Under the National Socialist ideology, which defamed Slavs as "subhumans," approximately 27 million people were killed in the Soviet Union. Following the logic of raison d'état, shouldn't one then also derive a specific historical responsibility toward Russia—as the Jewish political scientist Norman Finkelstein pointedly puts it?

So how far should one go? Should one formulate a separate form of historical responsibility for each individual victim group? Or isn't a different approach needed, a universal approach?

Especially in the case of a singular, negatively unique crime like the Holocaust, the question arises: Do we also have to draw a singular lesson from it? Wouldn't it make more sense to formulate the lesson universally, for all people, in all contexts? If we only concentrate on individual groups, there is a risk that we will overlook other victims. That we will accept human rights violations because our focus is too much on a singular, specifically historical interpretation. Should we therefore wait each time until a certain group becomes a singular victim again? Or wouldn't it be wiser to derive a general human rights standard from our history so that no one has to suffer from oppression, displacement or war again? Universality encompasses singular human rights, but singularity not universal ones. The protection of Jewish life is part of universal human rights. Anyone who ties this protection exclusively to Israel, on the other hand, is leaving the ground of the universal.

How problematic this singularity can be is particularly evident in the German case. As international law expert Kai Ambos emphasizes, our democratic state, with its concept of raison d'état , is based on an authoritarian concept that goes back to Machiavelli's theory of rule. This authoritarian legacy blinds us to the fundamental principles of our democracy: universal human rights and equality before the law.

Authoritarian raison d'état has so clouded our loyalty to international law that for almost two years we have passively tolerated the most serious war crimes in Gaza. Blinded by the idea of raison d'état, we watch as the International Criminal Court—which was established precisely because of our historic crimes—is attacked, delegitimized, and sabotaged. The Chief Prosecutor is threatened, his family is intimidated, and Germany remains silent.

In keeping with the authoritarian nature of the raison d'état, Germany is thus strengthening authoritarian forces, such as the ultra-right Israeli government. In doing so, we are achieving precisely the opposite of what was intended with historical responsibility: Instead of fighting fascism, we are encouraging it.

And in doing so, we overlook the changes taking place within society: Germany has long been a post-migrant society, with almost 30 percent of the population having a migration background. Many of these people cannot identify with an exclusively national culture of remembrance. Not only because their families were neither part of the Nazi state nor perpetrators, but also because many of them or their relatives have experienced war, violence, or displacement. For them, crimes and collective trauma are not solely tied to German history, but represent a universal experience. In a diverse society, such diverse memories of violence and injustice collide; a challenge, but also an opportunity for a more open, inclusive culture of remembrance. What is therefore called for is universal human rights-based access to history, responsibility, and politics, not an exclusive culture of remembrance that includes some and neglects others.

If this universal approach is lacking, exactly what we are currently experiencing will happen: German politicians condemn but fail to act. The fact that words are not followed by actions is also due to a culture of remembrance that remembers selectively and ignores universal standards. Anyone who then invokes international law and criticizes Israel must fear being vilified as an anti-Semite by people like Philipp Peyman Engel, editor-in-chief of the Jewish General, historian Michael Wolffsohn, or Israeli ambassador Ron Prosor.

Such people do not even realize how much they are diluting the concept of anti-Semitism with their overused appeal to reasons of state and thus achieving exactly the opposite of what they actually want: the protection of Jewish life.

If we truly want to better protect Jews, if we truly want to protect the oppressed, then we must free ourselves from an exclusive culture of remembrance. "Never again" must apply to everyone.

Reason of state or international law – the two together don't work. Germany must choose one.

Do you have feedback? Write to us! [email protected]