Amnesty, the end of it?

At the dawn of the independence process , the Constitutional Court issued a ruling on the Statute of Autonomy that provoked outrage among many voters in Catalonia. It curtailed a text that had been endorsed by popular vote. True, turnout wasn't massive (nearly 50%) with 74% support, but the excessive tactics of the Catalan parties ended up boring and confusing everyone. However, a Constitutional Court amending what was approved in a referendum couldn't have brought anything good. Some considered that this, along with other economic and political factors, was the spark that lit the Catalan independence movement. Today, 15 years later, the scenario is similar but opposite. The Constitutional Court's ruling upholding the amnesty for the leaders of the independence process could close a historic era in Catalonia that has had a notable impact on Spanish politics.

If the ruling on the Statute of Autonomy deepened the political crisis in Catalonia, ultimately bringing down the tripartite coalition led by José Montilla and giving rise to a radicalization of nationalism that would later have very serious consequences, the amnesty ruling has unleashed an unprecedented institutional clash between the judiciary and the central government. Pedro Sánchez's term in office is inextricably linked to the two measures of clemency—pardons and amnesty—granted to the Catalan independence movement in exchange for their parliamentary support. This situation has polarized Spanish politics, divided almost equally between the right and the left-wing forces allied with the nationalists. Paradoxically, what was initially a concern for Pedro Sánchez is now his mainstay.

Political pressure is nothing new for the Constitutional Court. While in the case of the Statute of Autonomy, many sought to have the ruling water down the text, this time furious criticism has sought to prevent the amnesty from being endorsed. The difference is that, this time, the pressure has not only come from the political sphere, but more specifically from the judiciary. The Supreme Court has expressed its outright rejection of this law. The amnesty has fueled a wave of animosity toward the Sánchez administration, evident in the high judiciary, despite its insistence on its impartiality. The amnesty law has marked a before and after.

Not even Sánchez himself was convinced by pardons or amnesty for a long time. It was Miquel Iceta , former leader of the Catalan Socialists, a leader often vilified by many pro-independence supporters, who first expressed his support for a pardon, immediately after the initial leaders of the independence process were remanded in custody and in the midst of the Catalan election campaign. Iceta was even reprimanded by his party colleagues. But in private, he continued to argue back in 2017 that, ultimately, there would be no other way out than pardons to reduce political tension in Catalonia and improve coexistence. He said this when the pro-independence supporters were still far from seeking a pardon, and Sánchez wasn't even considering it.

The amnesty has given rise to the surprising image of judges demonstrating in their robes in the streets.

More than seven years have passed, and the landscape has changed. Catalan society has new priorities, a Socialist presides over the Generalitat (Catalan government), and the independence movement lacks a majority in the Parliament. The leaders of the independence process have come to terms with reality, although they continue to argue that amnesty is not the same as pardons because it means the erasure of crimes. However, the parties that defend secession remain key to governability in Catalonia and Spain.

Some legal experts have written articles in the press comparing this law to a repeal of the Constitution. For its detractors, it constitutes little less than a targeted attack on the rule of law, especially given the fact that it was passed in exchange for the votes of a pro-independence party to keep the government in power. The amnesty law aims to put an end to an extremely turbulent political period in Catalonia and between it and the rest of Spain. It cannot be denied that it has achieved this, even before its full implementation. But at the same time, it has contributed to polarizing positions against the Sánchez government from right-wing parties and the judicial world.

The amnesty so infuriated the members of the courts that the judges even gathered in the streets dressed in their robes. They did so in November 2024 following the agreement between the PSOE and Junts (Junts ). It is ironic that the same judges who question the constitutionality of the amnesty because it is not enshrined in the Constitution defend the right to demonstrate against it when there is no consensus on whether the Constitution allows them to protest or call strikes, such as the one planned for early July. This strike is not about the amnesty, although it is always on the horizon. It is called against the justice reform promoted by Minister Félix Bolaños, for whom a judge has just requested an indictment in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court's struggle to prevent the application of the amnesty to certain leaders of the independence process is subject to a European stress test. Let's look at the sequence. Currently, Carles Puigdemont, Toni Comín, and Lluís Puig have been barred from benefiting from the amnesty and remain in Belgium. Oriol Junqueras, Jordi Turull, Raül Romeva, and Dolors Bassa have been partially pardoned but remain barred from holding public office.

The Constitutional Court has now issued its first ruling on the appeal filed by the People's Party (PP), and in September it will issue its first ruling on the 15 appeals filed by the autonomous regions governed by that party. The first does not address embezzlement, which, according to the Supreme Court, could not be amnestied because it would violate European law. Thus, although the Constitutional Court now upholds the amnesty law, it does not address the issue of embezzlement, which will prevent its full implementation, even though it represents a political victory for the government and Junts.

Towards the autumn, the Constitutional Court will resolve the constitutionality issues raised by the Supreme Court and, finally, the appeals for constitutional protection from the convicted parties. Will it then be applicable? Not yet. The Constitutional Court expects the European Court of Justice to rule after the summer on an appeal from the Spanish Court of Auditors, this time on the thorny issue of embezzlement. Based on the available evidence, such as the report provided by the European Commission, the CJEU could rule that the embezzlement attributed to the convicted parties did not cause any harm to the EU. If that is the case, it would make no sense for the Supreme Court to insist on questioning the CJEU on the same matter, simply to delay the application of the law. Then the outcome would finally be expedited, probably towards the end of the year.

In this way, the most important commitment Sánchez made to secure Junts' votes for his investiture will be fulfilled. Whether this consolidates the relationship or, on the contrary, causes the beginning of a rift remains to be seen. Although it's logical that Puigdemont will want to maintain his influence in Madrid. With the former president back, both Puigdemont and Junqueras would be in a position to compete with Salvador Illa in the next Catalan elections if they so desired. Catalonia would enter a period of complete normalization, with the rise of the far right (Catalan independence or Spanish independence) as the main focus of attention, while Spanish politics descends into instability.