Trump Isn't Engaging In “Strategic Ambiguity” on Iran. It's Something Much More Dangerous.

Sign up for the Slatest to get the most insightful analysis, criticism, and advice out there, delivered to your inbox daily.

What is Donald Trump up to? What is he trying to accomplish? Asked by reporters on Tuesday whether he'll join Israel in its attacks on Iran, the president replied, “I may do it, I may not do it,” adding, “Nobody knows what I'm going to do.”

Sometimes a remark like this can be useful; it can produce an adversary into behaving with caution. Trump's supporters have lauded him for his mastery of “ strategic ambiguity ”—a term coined by scholars of international relations to describe policies designed to deter aggression without quite spelling out the consequences.

But that's not what's going on here. In order for this ambiguity to be effective, leaders should have an idea of ​​what they would do if war came—of how they would like to see the conflict play out.

Yet it's clear, from all evidence, that Trump himself is among those who don't know what he's going to do. His contradictions breed only confusion; they might rein in Iran's supreme leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but they might also spur him to take gigantic risks, believing (or hoping) that the threats are just bluffs. In any case, Trump has lost control of the narrative—the opposite of what any leader, much less a superpower, should do while playing this game.

Trump has gone back and forth on the question of whether to join Israel's attacks on Iran, but in the past few days his words and deeds seemed to indicate that US intervention was imminent. He warned residents of Tehran—a city of 9 million people, in a country of 90 million—to evacuate immediately . He said he'd given Iran an “ ultimatum .” He said that when his emissary started negotiations with Iranians to get them to give up their nuclear program, he gave them a 60-day deadline—and “ today is 61, right ?” He said he was demanding “ unconditional surrender .” He said he knew where “the so-called Supreme Leader” was hiding, though he wasn't going to kill him—“ not now ,” anyway, suggesting that he might do so later (something that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu definitely would like to see happen).

Then came his “To be, or not to be” act—maybe he'll attack, maybe he won't, “nobody knows what I'm going to do.” Now Trump says he'll decide what to do within the next two weeks .

This is not strategic ambiguity; it is, at best, ambivalence. In any case, a leader should not utter the rather definitive statements that Trump has uttered the past few days if he still hadn't made up his mind, or if his mind was whirring like a strobe light.

Given Trump's consistent record of inconsistency—his frequent threats, followed by reversals (and sometimes reversals of reversals), whether on tariffs, foreign conquests (cf. Greenland, Panama, Canada), or deporting migrants—Khamenei could reasonably conclude that the threats of recent days are more of the same and that, therefore, he needn't back down. This, of course, could lead to catastrophe, especially if Trump decided to follow through this time—and Khamenei followed through on his own threats to unleash hundreds of missiles against Israel and US bases throughout the Middle East if Trump intervenes.

Whatever happens, world leaders—all of whom are closely watching these events—are learning that nothing this president says should be taken seriously. Again, this is not strategic ambiguity. It's merely the rantings of an overconfident president who thinks that acting tough gets results but doesn't know what results he wants.

The best thing Trump could have done, when reporters asked him what he might do or not do in Iran, was to say nothing. Yes, he should have publicly noted that Iran's pace of uranium enrichment is concerning, that he is considering a range of options. It was also a good idea, in and of itself, to move military assets, especially cargo-transport planes and aircraft carrier groups, into the region—whether as a unearth or preparation for action. (It could serve both functions; that’s strategic ambiguity.) But then he should have kept quiet.

He should have sent private messages to Israel and Iran and consulted with other leaders—especially Arab and European allies—who have stakes in this war and its outcome. The problem is, Trump craves the spotlight; he can't resist talking at length when cameras and microphones are pointed his way. And he finds allies unnecessary, at times annoying. He thinks he can figure out everything by himself. In recent days, he has called Cabinet meetings to discuss the options, but his secretaries—all of his minions—have learned to go along with everything he says. Offering contrary views gets them nowhere.