Egypt: A Regional Pivot, Not a Crisis Hotbed

In mid-June 2025, Egypt blocked dozens of international activists, including citizens from the United States, Europe and Africa, who came to Cairo to participate in the “Global March to Gaza” in solidarity with the Palestinian population. According to AP News , several participants were stopped, arrested or deported already at Cairo International Airport.

Sources on the ground reported incidents of abuse, intimidation and even kidnapping (at least three) of organizers. Some activists also denounced the distribution of food contaminated with nails as a form of physical sabotage, as reported by WSWS.org .

The Egyptian government justified the measures on security grounds: the area between El-Arish and Rafah was declared a military no-go zone , and all political activity was repressed to “avoid regional destabilization” ( Reuters , Atlantic Council ).

More than 40 Canadians who were taking part in a global march to Gaza have been detained in Egypt and blocked from reaching the border of the war-torn enclave. https://t.co/zOujtzg0ir

— CityNews Toronto (@CityNewsTO) June 13, 2025

A tired and disillusioned society

Popular discontent in Egypt, already widespread for economic reasons, has intensified with the authoritarian management of the Palestinian question. The Egyptian population accuses the government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of having betrayed the Palestinian cause , aligning itself with Israeli and American interests.

A Wall Street Journal analysis highlighted how difficult it has become to openly criticize “a pro-Israel dictatorship,” noting that restrictions imposed on Gaza by Egypt and Jordan are nearly identical , fueling popular anger.

On social media, images of the arrests and deportations have created visible fractures in the Egyptian social fabric . The hashtag #RafahClosed has gone viral, contributing to a growing distrust of political elites at the candies.

The Cairo–Riyadh–Tehran Triangle: A Tactical Convergence

At the same time, there has been a tactical rapprochement between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran . Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly declared that Riyadh is “standing with Iran” in the conflict with Israel, marking a notable change in tone from the traditional Sunni-Shiite hostility.

This Cairo–Riyadh–Tehran convergence does not yet represent a structural alliance, but constitutes a tactical pact based on common opposition to the US-Israel line and on the management of balances in the Middle East.

However, this ambiguity creates friction with Washington , which sends Cairo around $1.3 billion in military aid every year, as IndiaTimes recalls.

But how is this ambivalence of the Egyptian government possible?

What appears to be a contradiction – on the one hand the Egyptian repression of pro-Gaza solidarity , on the other a tactical convergence between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran against the US-Israel line – is in reality the reflection of an ambivalent and defensive strategy of the Egyptian regime, determined by the need to balance external pressures and internal stability .

Here's how it can be explained coherently:

An ambivalent foreign policy to survive among powers

Al-Sisi's government does not have full autonomy , but moves between geopolitical constraints imposed by the United States (military aid, economic dependence) and the need not to alienate regional consensus , especially in the Arab-Islamic world.

• The convergence with Tehran and Riyadh is a tactical move. It is needed:

  • to stem diplomatic isolation,

  • to demonstrate to its partners in the global South an “independent” posture ,

  • to contain internal and regional criticism of its passivity in the Gaza conflict.

But this happens at the state and diplomatic level , with cold calculation and calibrated rhetoric.

Internal repression to control dissent

On the contrary, the repression of protests and the censorship of the “Global March to Gaza” are internal political measures. The Egyptian government fears:

• that solidarity with Gaza becomes a catalyst for a wider uprising (always latent with the strength of the 'Muslim Brotherhood' in society) ,

• that the pro-Palestinian movement joins forces with the political opposition (Muslim Brotherhood, secular activists, trade unions),

• and that an unmanageable front opens up along the Rafah border , already a sensitive area from a military and smuggling point of view.

Bottom line: The government does not repress Palestinian solidarity as such, but fears that it will become a pretext for internal instability .

A double face for two audiences

This ambiguity is typical of autocratic regimes living under pressure:

• internally , the power appears rigid, represses the squares, avoids any mobilization that it does not control;

• Outwardly , it uses pan-Arab or Islamic rhetoric to accredit itself as a sovereign actor aligned with the “Palestinian cause”.

It is a two-faced play , where al-Sisi does not want to be perceived as a puppet of the West nor as an open enemy of Israel, but as an indispensable interlocutor for both sides.

The contradiction between internal repression and external tactical convergences is not real, but apparent. It reflects the structural fragility of the Egyptian regime , forced to play multiple roles to survive.

Cairo is not really siding with Gaza, nor against Israel, nor with Tehran. Rather, it is trying to avoid collapse , maintaining internal control and buying time in the changing Middle Eastern landscape.

⚖️ The price of ambiguity

This strategy, although understandable from a realpolitik perspective, has costs:

• on the domestic front , distrust and the perception of hypocrisy are increasing;

• on a regional level , it makes Cairo less credible in the eyes of the Arab populations;

• in relations with Washington , opens an ambiguity that risks compromising future aid, especially in an increasingly polarized US political climate.

Economic crisis and systemic risk

Political instability is intertwined with a deep internal economic crisis :

• The tourism sector – vital to the Egyptian economy – has seen a decline of between 10% and 30% year-on-year.

• The Suez Canal has seen a 40% reduction in revenue, both due to the conflict in the Red Sea and increasing competition from Eurasian corridors ( Wikipedia ).

At the same time, repression continues to intensify, generating a vicious circle between authoritarianism and social anger . Analysts believe that the balance between coercion and consent is crumbling , leaving room for a possible scenario of internal collapse.

Fear of a new crisis front

If the discontent were to erupt into a mass uprising, Egypt could become a new regional flashpoint .

With its central role:

• in the control of the Rafah crossing ,

• in the diplomatic management of the siege on Gaza ,

• and in the protection of commercial and military transit in the Eastern Mediterranean ,

a systemic crisis in Egypt would have disastrous consequences for the security and stability of the entire region. Israel, the United States, the EU and the UN would be directly involved, and their strategic interests would be compromised.

Conclusion: Egypt as the center of gravity of the Mediterranean

The Egyptian government is moving on a dangerous path: on the one hand it forcefully represses any dissent , on the other it is drawing closer to regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia) in an opportunistic and unstable manner.

This situation could transform Egypt into the next major geopolitical crisis . Its fall – even if only partial – would compromise the fragile balance of the Mediterranean, blocking trade routes, increasing energy instability and triggering new waves of migration and jihadism.

It is time for Western diplomacy to abandon the instrumental vision of Egypt as a simple anti-terrorism bulwark or passive recipient of strategic aid. A new regional policy is needed, capable of recognizing the Egyptian people as a historical subject and central actor , and not as a pawn in global power dynamics.

However, this renewed attention cannot be based on abstract measures or pre-established models . The experience of the so-called Arab Springs – in Egypt as in Syria – has already shown the disasters that derive from ideological interventions and the illusion of exporting democracy according to Western models.

An approach such as the one that characterized the management of the Regeni case, based on selective moralism and unilateral pressure, would only stiffen relationships and accentuate defensive closure and suspicion.

On the contrary, what is needed today is a deep and realistic dialogue between states , based on an understanding of internal dynamics, respect for cultural specificities and the abandonment of any hegemonic ambition.

An ever deeper understanding and collaboration between states, without mania for power and imposition of external models, is the path on which everyone can collaborate.