China's plan to dominate the Pacific

China has intensified its military expansion in the Southwest Pacific after conducting combat exercises in the Tasman Sea in February and March 2025. The maneuvers, carried out without warning in waters between Australia and New Zealand, demonstrated the Chinese Navy's growing capabilities in long-range navigation, logistics, and reconnaissance. They also revealed Beijing's confidence in its maritime situational awareness and its ability to understand distant seas.

Some analysts link China's presence in Tasmania to the Pillar II meeting of the Aukus, the security and defense strategy of the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Others see it as a response to the US, Australia, and New Zealand's operations promoting freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. But the message goes further: China wants to dominate the Pacific and force Australia and New Zealand to accept the new order.

In my new report, China's Dual-Use Infrastructure in the Pacific, published as part of the Coastwatchers 2.0 project, I argue that China's actions reflect a long-term strategy to dominate the region. China incorporates its military objectives into the dual-use infrastructure projects it promotes in Pacific island nations through the Belt and Road Initiative: ports, docks, fisheries, aviation hubs, and communications networks. These assets bolster Chinese military operations but are camouflaged behind civilian investments.

China has the world's largest naval force, with 400 combat ships and a planned 425 by 2030. Its activities are increasingly extending beyond the so-called "first island chain" and into the "third island chain" and even into South America. The maneuvers in the Tasman Sea underscore Beijing's intention to break through traditional lines of contention and alter the balance of power in the region. Dual-use infrastructure plays a key role in this strategy.

The report identifies nine ports, two fishing facilities, 17 aeronautical projects, and fourteen communications infrastructure projects linked to Chinese companies, most of them state-owned and related to the defense sector. All of these create a dual-use ecosystem that enhances its military capabilities throughout the region. However, China manages to avoid scrutiny of its strategic objectives in the Pacific in three ways.

First, it sells these projects as engines of local economic growth. Evidence shows the opposite: larger docks or airstrips rarely increase maritime traffic or air operations. Second, Chinese companies dominate Pacific contracts financed by the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank. This shifts financial responsibility to international organizations while masking Beijing's intentions. And third, China relies on discreet, long-term investments.

At the same time, the affiliation between Chinese contractors and defense entities raises additional concerns. China Merchants Port Holdings owns 50% of the Port of Newcastle, Australia, near a potential site for Aukus nuclear submarines. The company collaborates with state-owned defense contractors such as China Electronics Technology Group and works closely with Huawei and Tencent, both designated military companies by the United States. Sensitive data is likely flowing directly to Beijing.

Papua New Guinea faces similar risks. China has developed ten aeronautical projects and five communications centers on the island. The Lae port project and the planned fishing industrial park on Daru Island are located at strategic points along critical shipping routes. This dual-use Chinese ecosystem is even more alarming when combined with its advanced military technology.

In 2024, Beijing tested an intercontinental ballistic missile in the Pacific, showcasing the improvement of its missile guidance systems. Ground stations in Australia, connected to BeiDou, and dual-use devices at regional airports and consulates improve the Chinese military's situational awareness. Meanwhile, deep-sea mining initiatives with nations such as Fiji, Samoa, Kiribati, and the Cook Islands expand the capabilities of underwater robotics that could aid underwater navigation.

The report highlights that China continues to normalize its military presence in the Pacific, while simultaneously using covert dual-use infrastructure to enhance its C4I capabilities—the integrated system of processes and technology used to support military operations and decision-making. These developments aim to limit the freedom of action of regional actors and strengthen Beijing's control over the region.

China's aggressive military actions in the Tasman Sea are not a reaction to events, but rather the execution of a calculated strategy to dominate the Pacific. Recognizing this threat requires urgent measures to counter Beijing's militarization before it permanently changes the regional power dynamics.

*Coastwatcher 2.0 project researcher, works at the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (Indsr) in Taiwan and is a contributor to Análisis Sinico at www.cadal.org.