First signs?

After the April hurricane, we seem to have entered a calmer zone: stock markets have reversed some of their losses, US Treasury bonds have reduced yields, and the dollar has contained its decline. Part of this relaxation reflects the start of negotiations between the US and some of its most important trading partners, such as Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam; also, the hope (or desire) that an agreement will be reached with China; and, finally, some moderation, or temporary exclusion, of some tariffs.

However, signs of an impact on the real economy are beginning to accumulate, both in the anecdotal evidence of a decline in trade and in the growth forecasts. Thus, the available information on Chinese shipments to the US confirms their sharp decline, and the same can be said of the arrival of goods to China from American ports. This is nothing unexpected given the 145% tariffs on products imported from China or the 125% tariffs on Chinese purchases from the US.

Symptoms of impact on the real economy are beginning to accumulate.

For its part, the IMF's forecasts for 2025 and 2026 confirm the view of a shock that is not particularly severe and, moreover, temporary. Thus, for 2025, it expects a reduction in global growth from the previous 3.2% to the current 2.8% (and to 3.0% in 2026); and a decrease of approximately 0.4% in GDP growth in the US (to 1.8% in 2025 and 1.7% in 2026), in the EU (1.2% this year and an improvement to 1.5% in 2026), and in China (4.0%, both in 2025 and 2026). Spain, for its part, continues to expect further growth (2.5% in 2025 and 1.8% in 2026). Furthermore, inflation forecasts reflect modest increases in the US and near-stability in the eurozone. Overall, the impact of the tariff shock is expected to be moderate.

It remains to be seen whether they respond to the conviction that blood will never flow, or to the uncertainty about a future that is too complex to predict. I am inclined to an agreement, which would perhaps exclude China, between America's main trading partners. This could include lower tariffs, a fall in the dollar (remember the Plaza Accords in New York in 1985), and increased domestic demand from countries with trade surpluses with the US. In this context, perhaps the German decision to allow increases in its debt to finance defense or infrastructure spending, or the €800 billion investment required by Draghi's plan, are better understood. These measures will boost domestic demand in the eurozone, which, combined with the strength of the euro, should reduce its surplus and contribute to the desirable agreement.

Not bad, given what we've seen. Although it's also possible that the current relative calm is merely the eye of the storm. Because, as Murphy's Law suggests, everything is susceptible to getting worse.