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To be the leader of the opposition

To be the leader of the opposition

What does it mean to be the leader of the opposition? Is it a merely symbolic title? Is being the leader of the opposition nothing more than being the leader of the second largest party in terms of number of mandates, the first in a long list of parties that did not win the elections? Or is it a title that brings with it special privileges and duties? Contrary to what I heard from some political commentators, acquaintances and friends, in the aftermath of the last elections, coming in second and being the leader of the opposition is not merely symbolic.

In many democratic systems, including Portugal, the second largest party has a number of privileges and institutional roles, from priority in government response and speaking time to the chairmanship of several standing parliamentary committees. Many of the institutional intra- and extra-parliamentary positions, political and judicial, are appointed by agreements between the main parties, which usually include the governing party and the main opposition party or parties. Some of these rules are written, others are tacit agreements that have lasted for decades (unwritten rules are much easier to break, especially in new situations).

Regardless of how they are codified, all these institutional rules and privileges are not a coincidence or a mere arrangement between corrupt politicians. They are, in fact, a way of including temporary losers in the current democratic system, especially those who represent large sections of the population, giving it legitimacy and representativeness. They are a way of preventing elections from being seen as an all-or-nothing affair that establishes a tyranny of the majority. And they are also a way of telling parties that did not win the last elections, but have the possibility of doing so in the future, that it is worth accepting the current system, in which they participate and that they can reform it in the future, instead of destroying it.

But these rules also give responsibilities and duties to the parties that lead the opposition and that intend to be in government. A party that wants to be the leader of the opposition and, in the near future, the leader of the government does not have the same nature as a mere protest party. The roles of a protest party and a government party do not fit together, at least in the traditional conception of our democratic system. Today, Chega wants to simultaneously be the leader of the opposition, but also states, on the first day of the legislative session, that this will be “the last legislature of the third republic.” Does it want to destroy the system or be part of it and, one day, who knows, lead it?

The role and power given to opposition leaders varies significantly between countries and institutional constellations, and the very concept of the existence of a “leader of the opposition” is not the same in Westminster systems or in multi-party parliamentary systems. In fact, the concept of “leader of the opposition” seems clearly derived from a two-party system with two sides – government versus opposition – that oppose and confront each other, even visually, as in the seating arrangements of the British or Canadian parliaments. The opposition party clearly has the role of scrutinizing and holding the government to account, of constituting itself as the main alternative, often even forming a shadow government . As David Runciman, professor of politics at Cambridge (and author of the podcast Past, Present and Future ), explains in a recent article , the system of loyal opposition traditionally associated with British parliamentarism implies that, beyond the theatrical spectacle of the plenary, there is simultaneously a shared responsibility between opposition and government. The role of opposition involves work and not just privileges, because the opposition leader must demonstrate that he or she is capable of being the leader of a government.

In contrast, in the proportional and multi-party parliamentary systems of continental Europe, legislative assemblies are arranged in hemicycles, where parties sit from left to right, according to their ideology and relative size. This does not mean that the parties that come second (and third and fourth, etc.) do not have access to numerous privileges and institutional positions; quite the opposite: precisely because there are multiple parties, these are generally consensual systems, where several parties form coalitions and where several parties (whether in government or not) share positions. However, in these systems, it seems far-fetched to say that there is only one opposition to the government. After all, it is perfectly possible to have two, three or four parties of similar size in opposition at the same time and criticizing the government from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum.

As I suggested in my last column, albeit in a slightly different way, the Portuguese system is a kind of hybrid, with a proportional and multi-party arm and another, more majoritarian arm, which was formed by the bipartisan dynamic between the PS and PSD, which in fact took turns as government and “leader of the opposition”. With the new parliament elected in the elections of 18 May, what will happen to this system? Chega claims for itself the status of “leader of the opposition”, a status that, for years, was reserved for the PS and PSD, depending on who came second. However, Chega also says, and with some reason, that “the bipartisan system is over in Portugal”. Now, this means that, until a new bipartisan system is formed, there will be no single leader of the opposition. When three medium-to-large parties compete for leadership and government, there is no longer a single opposition.

Returning to David Runciman’s text, the political scientist argues that the system of loyal opposition , which has traditionally prevailed in the United Kingdom, is currently at risk. He notes that, in the United Kingdom, this role is at stake due to the growing fragmentation of parties, as well as the electoral threat of the Reform UK party (of Nigel Farage), which clearly aims to overtake and replace the Conservative party, currently the leading opposition party. Runciman writes that currently “the second largest party [the Conservative party] is more concerned with not being overtaken by other smaller parties” than with providing the loyal opposition to the government, which requires seriousness, hard work, and qualifications. For their part, these smaller parties can “show off and grandstand in parliament without assuming great responsibilities.”

Here, with all due differences, we also have an imbalance in the imperfect two-party system to which we have become accustomed. This imbalance completely changes the pattern of competition and has several facets that, together, increase the dysfunction and uncertainty of the coming times. The government, with a minority parliamentary base, has two parties with whom it simultaneously competes and wishes to cooperate for its own governance. Cooperation and competition simultaneously and in duplicate, to its left and to its right. It does not seem easy.

Chega aims to be the leader of the opposition and one day become the leader of the government, but it continues to use the strategy of a protest party, instead of a responsible party of loyal opposition . After all, it was the strategy of destroying, not building, that brought the party this far. But not all phases of growth are the same and the arrogance of recent success should not make them forget that, at the moment, the party is not electorally bigger than the PS and does not have experience or government personnel or allies in a multi-party framework that requires them.

The Socialist Party, for its part, faces a delicate situation: simultaneously opposing the government in order to replace it, fighting Chega in order to regain its status as the main opposition, and, paradoxically, supporting the government when the instability created by Chega threatens governability and the regime itself. These three functions are hardly compatible and it is not clear that there are politicians who are up to the task.

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