Onur Alp Yılmaz wrote: Is anti-Atatürk hysteria the obstacle to the Kurdish issue?

Recently, Taner Akçam wrote an article that confuses desires with facts, failing only to repeat the canonical narratives of the post-1980 post-Kemalist paradigm. Dedicated to legitimizing even the government's attempt to undermine the CHP through mind-boggling anti-Kemalist hysteria—perhaps we should use a new term, "Kemalophobia," for this hysterical state—this article's main argument, while hidden behind flowery phrases, was actually quite simple: that the CHP is a potential center of opposition to a solution to the Kurdish issue, and that therefore weakening it politically would pave the way for the resolution process. Sounds unbelievable, doesn't it? No way… Because the tradition of attributing everything to the CHP isn't unique to this article by Akçam. As I mentioned above, this approach is an extension of the prevalent post-1980 paradigm that undermines republican philosophy. This article merely adapts the arguments of this paradigm to the current situation.

To elaborate further, the post-Kemalist paradigm sees the events between 1908 and 1945 as the "source of all evil" and virtually markets the founding of the republic as an "original sin." So much so that even if we cannot purify ourselves from this "original sin," we can at least find salvation together when we repent. So, how did the post-Kemalist paradigm arrive at this point? To understand this, we need to consider how left-liberalism emerged.

While the rise of left-wing liberalism in Türkiye is often associated with country-specific dynamics, it should actually be considered part of a similar transformation observed internationally. This current of thought explains its rise in Türkiye, particularly in the aftermath of the September 12 coup, as a result of the profound sense of defeat, widespread despair, and lack of social self-confidence that resulted from this defeat. In this context, it is argued that traumatic processes experienced in the political and social spheres paved the way for certain ideological shifts.

This left-liberal perspective is built upon a West-East dichotomy that borders on Orientalism. This dichotomy places the historical and structural differences between the two regions at the center of its analysis. It is argued that power in the West has been fragmented for thousands of years—since the pre-capitalist era. This fragmented structure facilitated the emergence of autonomous individuals and the early development of the market economy and capitalism. As a natural consequence, a strong and autonomous civil society emerged. In this context, the fundamental reason for the entrenched and enduring nature of Western democracies is the historically distributed structure of power and the space this affords civil society for development.

In contrast, in the East—especially in the case of Turkey—the historical process has followed a completely different course. Here, the monolithic nature of power and the absolute power of the central state, observed from the outset, prevented the free development of the market economy and capitalism. This led to civil society remaining weak and groaning under the absolute dominance of the state for centuries. Therefore, from this perspective, the root of Türkiye's social and political problems lies in this power structure, which differs from the West, and its oppressive effect on civil society.

In short, left-wing liberalism interprets the defeat of September 12th along the historical axis of "strong state-weak civil society." According to this approach, the fundamental polarization in Türkiye lies not so much in the labor-capital relationship but in the deep divide between state and society. Undoubtedly, the ban on leftist thought following September 12th played a significant role in this. The veteran leftists who had never earned a living, the left-liberal elders of the new era, began to produce work on daily life, and this led them to cultural studies. Income inequality and social exclusion were no longer linked to classes, but to identities and cultural codes. And they did this at a time when prestige, the transition from exclusion to inclusion, was linked to wealth and consumption more than ever before; and when "making ends meet" by any means was considered sacred. At that very moment, they discovered that the theoretical framework with which they would legitimize this had already been put forward in 1974: Şerif Mardin's famous article, which argued that the main contradiction in the process from the Ottoman Empire to Türkiye was cultural and saw the conflict between the center that held power and the periphery that it excluded.[1]

Meanwhile, they realized that nostalgia trading and manipulating history were generating wealth and prestige. After all, it was the era of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and Özal was in power. Foundations, associations, and publishing houses were immediately established; advisory positions were snatched up within the ANAP, led by Özal, and even some became MPs. And a vigil was launched… Against what? Kemalism, of course… It had become the cause of every evil. It was the era of strikes against the oppressed. According to this narrative, ANAP (later the AK Party) represented the “oppressed periphery” against this “despotic center.” Against the “top-down” policies of the Republic, it represented the purity, cleanliness, and belonging of the “periphery.” So these “intellectuals” had to gain as much public visibility as possible, and they did… As if they were wandering around a dogless village without a crutch, they slapped labels on the Republic and its portraits: traitor, dictator, fascist… They were giving it credit, taking it away; they were whitewashing it, denigrating it. But wasn’t this just as “top-down” as the Republic they accused of “top-down”? Was this how democratic culture was supposed to be constructed? They had reached such a point that everyone and everything that didn’t suit them was being foisted on Kemalism: Mehmet Ağar was a Kemalist, for example, and so was Uğur Mumcu… Bülent Ecevit was a Kemalist, and so was Kenan Evren, who repeatedly imprisoned him… The CHP, which hadn’t seen power for 50 years, was also a party of bureaucratic elitism, and so was the CHP, which remained in power uninterrupted from 1923 to 1950… Kemalophobia had already resurfaced.

So, did Kemalism possess such a monolithic and static ideological framework? In fact, when we examine its internal debates, we clearly see that this was not the case. For example, the Kemalist intellectuals who, from the 1950s to 1965, declared, "This revolution was incomplete," and aimed to develop society through welfare state tools, are the most concrete examples of this internal dynamism. So, what happened to these intellectuals? Many of them were murdered in the period from the late 1980s to the 1990s. Therefore, one cannot speak of the existence of a caricatured Kemalist group, sip-swilling whiskey on the Bosphorus, insulting the public, can one?

In this era, when these reputation-mongering intellectuals were virtually pulling the rug from under the Republic, some of whom were murdered, the rest were being purged from the state. The institutions established after September 12th to purge the leftist Kemalists were a crucial part of this process. [2] In other words, while they collaborated on a new reading of history with parties claiming to represent the same tradition, from the ANAP to the AK Party, as a source of wealth, they were also producing in this field, while presenting the losers of the era to society as caricatured characters. The "White Turk" fallacy, which Akçam also emphasizes in his article, is also magnificent in this regard. This definition had reached such a point that this label was now being applied to anyone who owned a home, rented a house, struggled to survive on a meager salary while cultivating cultural and artistic experience, and read books and respected Atatürk—as if they were enjoying caviar on the Bosphorus every evening. So, how many "White Turks" were there in Türkiye, really? Koç, Sabancı, Cengiz, Limak? Could even a handful of them be considered the cream of this country? Really, which parties did they support and work for? These questions were unimportant, of course; if you respect Atatürk and read books, then goodness gracious, then there you are: You were a "White Turk"!

So, the approach that equates the CHP, which was put on trial in 1980 for alleged Kurdish nationalism and the MHP's denunciation of it; which introduced representatives of the Kurdish political movement to Parliament from its own lists in 1987 and 1991; which published its 1989 report at a time when even the word "Kurd" was considered separatist by state bodies; and which currently equates the CHP during the single-party era with the CHP, whose mayors are being held in prison due to the "urban consensus"... That, of course, is another cautionary tale. There's much more to write on this topic, but it's not necessary to go into too much detail.

Akçam's statement in his article, claiming that the AKP and MHP excluded the CHP from the system because "CHP members oppose the peace process," represents more than a fact, a perception they're trying to create. This mindset, which decides whether to issue us all democratic certificates, which holds the democratic tape measure in its hands, crosses a new threshold every day. I struggle to understand how someone who, let alone being a democrat, has even a minimal legal norm firmly in their minds, can rationalize this and present it to us as an "idea."

Moreover, a claim devoid of any evidence has been made: There appears to be a discrepancy between the stance of CHP officials on the Kurdish initiative and their grassroots. In other words, while CHP leaders at the top displayed a positive outlook on the Kurdish initiative, there was a significant opposition within the grassroots. Journalists like Sözcü newspaper and Fatih Altaylı were also representatives of this "base."

How, isn't it magnificent? Yet another magnificent level of democracy deciding who represents the CHP base... Seeing the CHP base, which has raised its voice against the appointed trustees for 10 years, fall further behind on the Kurdish issue than the ruling party base, which has been sanctifying war for 10 years... But is that really the case?

A study we conducted in December 2024 tells us that the CHP base, after the DEM Party, is the most vocal in its support of the Kurdish issue in Türkiye. They see the solution to this problem as democratization, development, and the elimination of inequality in income distribution between regions.

Let's get back to our topic... As claimed in this post-Kemalist article, a classic reflection of Kemalophobia, is the CHP being excluded from the system because it might actually oppose a solution, or is the blissful solution process being instrumentalized to push the CHP out of the system? If we're talking about a government that ended the solution process the day it lost its sole power on June 7, 2015, finding the answer to this question shouldn't be too difficult.

Finally, let's return to the question that Akçam posed, devoid of any data, through the CHP: Is the obstacle to the Kurdish issue the "Atatürk myth" or is it the rudeness of Akçam and his ilk towards Atatürk?

Wouldn't this reckless attitude towards Atatürk and the Republic, who were educated and promoted through the achievements of the Republic, who were equalized by the definition of citizenship, who were able to live together with others thanks to the principle of secularism, and most importantly, who appreciated this, whom they respected and saw as a leader and who still constitute one of the greatest common denominators of society, lead people to believe that they will be the losers of this "solution"?

Especially today, at a time when various proposals are coming from the ruling party implying that democracy could be stifled in exchange for recognition of ethnic identities…

[1] A Key to Explaining Turkish Politics: Center-Periphery Relations.

[2] For an article of mine on this subject, see “The Liquidation of Left-Kemalism: The Kemalism of September 12 and Its Origins”, Atatürk Yolu Magazine, Issue: 70, 2022.