Thousands of empty mosques: The mullahs have driven religion out of Iranians

The Iranian people have experienced the devastating consequences of Islamism firsthand in recent decades. Economically, the regime has plunged the country into poverty. In foreign policy, it has isolated and humiliated Iran. Socially, the people have been deprived of many rights, especially those of women. Militarily, the regime has also proven itself to be a paper tiger, as is currently becoming apparent. All of this, and the realization that republicanism and Islamism (read: Islamic Republic) are contradictory, have left deep scars.

The gaps between the freedom movements have become increasingly narrow over the past twenty years. During the second phase of the Green Movement in 2009, slogans were heard demanding a clear demarcation from religious influence on politics. Particularly striking was the call for "Independence, freedom, Iranian Republic," a response to the central slogan of the Islamic Revolution, "Independence, freedom, Islamic Republic." Another recurring slogan in later movements was: "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon – my life for Iran!"

During the Dey Uprising (2017/18), people went a step further: "You are instrumentalizing Islam and causing the people to suffer," "We are sacrificing both Islam and the Koran for Iran," or "Reza Shah, may your soul rest in peace." (Reza Shah, a contemporary of Atatürk, deposed the religious scholars in Iran and made a significant contribution to the country's modernization—albeit in violation of the constitution.) During the Aban Uprising (2019), the cry "We will give our lives to reclaim our country!" was heard for the first time. This made it clear that parts of the population perceive the regime as an internal occupying force.

All of the above-mentioned slogans also resurfaced in the recent protest movement "Woman, Life, Freedom" (2022/23), which, among other things, revealed the regime's ideological failure most clearly due to the removal of the headscarf, but is often falsely reduced to a purely feminist protest. In the approximately eight hundred protest slogans I identified, terms like "Iranian," "Iran," and "homeland" appeared about a hundred times. They proved to be central buzzwords that – among other things – consciously marked a counterpoint to Islamism, as demonstrated by the slogans "In the name of religion and faith, Iran was sold off" and "Only when the cleric lies in a shroud will this country become a true homeland."

The country has also changed significantly in religious terms. The "Islamic Republic" is now considered one of the most secular countries in the Islamic world – precisely because the population was forced for decades to practice a form of religiosity prescribed by the regime. This state-imposed piety has led many to reject, and in some even to open hatred of, the religion. Mohammed Haj Abolghasem Dolabi, a member of the Council of Experts, lamented the empty and abandoned mosques: "Today, of the approximately 75,000 mosques in the country, 50,000 are closed – a catastrophe that must be mourned."

At the same time, an intense inner process began decades ago: Many people are questioning religion itself and are coming to a personal renunciation of their faith. Atheism and agnosticism have increased significantly. At the same time, works critical of Islam by Iranian authors from the 19th century have been rediscovered abroad, and a unique body of writings critical of religion has emerged, the extent of which is unprecedented in Iranian history.

A clear trend toward a return to Iran's pre-Islamic heritage is also evident. This is reflected, among other things, in the increasing number of visitors to the tomb of Cyrus the Great, a king of the Achaemenid dynasty. More and more people are wearing symbols of ancient Iran, while Islamic names are increasingly being replaced by old Persian names when naming children. Also notable are renamings at home and abroad, such as Ali becoming Cyrus or Fatemeh becoming Shirin. Furthermore, weddings are increasingly being based on ancient Iranian engagement ceremonies rather than Islamic ones.

This is a direct consequence of the regime's vehement attempt to erase ancient Iran from collective memory: Ideologies often prove counterproductive. Yes, Islamist rule, of all things, has led to a political and religious secularization of society in Iran. But education (50 percent of students in Iran are women), urbanization, the internet, and the associated access to global knowledge and alternative perspectives have also played an important role.

After the Islamic Revolution (1979), isolated secularist voices emerged at home and abroad, which were considered more like isolated individual opinions until the founding of the electronic journal "Newsecularism" (2007–2013). It was only with this publication, whose editor-in-chief was Esmail Nooriala, a retired university lecturer living in the USA, that secularism, and shortly thereafter the concept of secular democracy, became central themes among political activists, journalists, lawyers, and academics at home and abroad.

Nooriala consistently emphasized that the Islamic regime was based on a particular interpretation of Shiism—it was both religious and dictatorial, and that its alternative could therefore only be a secular and democratic system. He also coined the term "newsecularism," as he believed in the existing view that not only religion, but any ideology, must be separate from the state. In response to the objection that democracy implies secularism anyway, he responded, among other things, that Islamist-oriented reformists spoke of a "religious democracy"—in contrast, one should emphasize "secular democracy" as a counter-model. "Newsecularism" in the newspaper "Keyhan" was repeatedly subjected to harsh criticism by Hossein Shariatmadari, spokesman for the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He described the magazine as "anti-Islamic"—an accusation the editorial staff consistently rejected.

The discourse has become so dominant that even Iranian Nobel Peace Prize winner and lawyer Shirin Ebadi – who just a decade ago was striving to derive democracy and gender equality from Islam – stated unequivocally in a 2022 interview: "Iran's new constitution will be democratic and secular; we will have a separation of state and religion." The numerous freely accessible draft constitutions already written, primarily by Iranian exiles, confirm Ebadi's thesis.

Even in religious educational institutions, which are supposed to train clergy loyal to the regime, secularism is now palpable. This attitude drew sharp criticism from Ali Khamenei. On October 9, 2012, he declared at a meeting with clergy: "If we do not concern ourselves with the affairs of the system and the government, that is secularism." Khamenei's warnings about this development were even documented in a separate book.

Over the past fifteen years, numerous gatherings of Iranian exiles have taken place, primarily in Germany, under the umbrella of the "Congress of Secular Democratic Forces of Iran." The goal was to create an alternative to the regime in Tehran. I personally participated in five of these meetings. Numerous prominent figures, including the Shiite cleric Hossein Kazemeyni Borujerdi, who is based in Iran and openly professed secularism, addressed messages to the congress.

The attempt to build a viable alternative abroad ultimately failed. Nevertheless, it is clear that the alternative to this regime already exists in the minds of many people. The crucial question is whether the people of Iran themselves will finally succeed in implementing it. In this context, the attacks by Israel and the USA do not appear to be beneficial. At present, there is virtually nothing to indicate that regime change or a popular uprising could be imminent. On the contrary: The regime is now entering into negotiations with the USA and wants to make peace, solely in the interest of maintaining power. It could succeed in doing so. Much to the chagrin of the population.

Mahdi Rezaei-Tazik is an Iranian-Swiss political scientist and Iranist.