Half a year of Trump: Foreign policy | The world power can endure this

The incumbent US president, like the global new right as a whole, lacks a coherent, feasible political-economic project. Donald Trump makes a wide variety of promises to various interest groups: for example, low taxes for the rich and the middle class, a return of industrial jobs through chaotic trade policy action but without a planned industrial policy, full employment, and low inflation. It is impossible to fulfill all of these promises. Yet Trump succeeds—or succeeded—in maintaining this illusion for many years (until the beginning of the pandemic, roughly speaking): by skillfully creating scandals to set his own agenda, but also by calling out the failings of established US policy by their name.

This formula can actually be applied directly to Trump's foreign policy. As perhaps the first successful candidate for the White House, he spoke openly about the US's crimes around the world during the 2015/2016 election campaign. Also infamous is his 2023 promise that he would end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours .

But of course—and this has always been clear upon closer inspection—Trump is neither an anti-imperialist nor a peace president, and the war in Ukraine continues with undiminished brutality. Trump's foreign policy is catastrophic—for the world, as well as for the United States. The reason its destructive and destabilizing impact is not always immediately apparent is simple: The United States can afford bad government—so far, anyway. The structural and geoeconomic advantages enjoyed by the global hegemon are so deeply entrenched that they cannot be easily offset—not even by the hegemon itself.

Nuclear deal exit: A devastating decision

The upheavals resulting from Trump's foreign policy will therefore only become apparent in the medium term. This also applies to his first term in office from 2017 to 2021. Even then, his decisions were unlikely to lead to acute global crises—because even then, Trump shied away from taking excessive immediate risks, despite all his belligerent rhetoric.

The damage it caused was nevertheless significant. The US President's decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran was devastating; it significantly contributed to the destabilization of the region, which culminated in the wars in Yemen, Gaza, Lebanon, and between Israel and Iran. Although the Russian invasion of Ukraine took place during Joe Biden's term in office, it is clear that it was planned well in advance—that is, it was initiated by Russia during Trump's first term. Trump's Russia policy contributed to the failure to achieve a viable balance of interests, for example, within the framework of the Minsk Agreements, nor to deterring Russia from an attack by corresponding US security guarantees—both of which Trump had no interest in.

It would be a mistake to overly psychologize Trump's relationship with Russia, or with the Russian president. Trump may have personal sympathy for Putin as a like-minded autocrat. However, this is not decisive for the current relationship between the US and Russia. Trump essentially considers the Ukraine war a bad investment from which he would gladly withdraw – leaving the other NATO states to bear the costs. He prefers to cultivate bilateral relations through complex alliance architectures and clings to the idea that he can exert additional pressure on China by driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. This is a ludicrous undertaking that has so far failed, because Russia depends on China as an ally. Without the economic weight of the People's Republic behind him, Putin's dreams of a new – at least regional, if not continental – hegemony are unattainable.

The US can still afford to make some mistakes.

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The belief that he could simply make a deal with Putin to get the Ukraine problem off the table was a classic Trump mistake, one that the US president is now attempting to cover up with his ultimatum to Putin in a hasty course correction. Trump's worldview is based on a deeply transactional view of humanity. He has few abstract ideological goals or convictions, especially in foreign policy matters. US sociologist Vivek Chibber accuses him of thinking more in heuristics or "rules of thumb." He simply lacks the understanding that Putin's attack on the neighboring country is partly ideologically motivated.

Under certain circumstances, China could certainly be persuaded by the West to exert a moderating influence on Putin, since, conversely, it is not dependent on its northern neighbor for better or for worse and essentially desires stability there. This would, however, require a fundamental reset of US-China relations – largely ruined by Obama's disastrous "pivot to Asia." Competition with China as a zero-sum game is another of Trump's obsessions, one he shares with the establishment of both parties.

In the long term, Trump's alliance, economic, immigration, and energy policies are undermining the foundations of US hegemony. However, the US can still afford some mistakes in the medium term: It is still by far the largest military power on earth, with bases around the world, and is self-sufficient in agriculture and fossil fuels, as well as, at least potentially, renewable energy. The US also benefits from the disunity of its adversaries: Neither Europe nor the Global South, for example, has managed to find a coordinated response to Trump's trade policy antics. Mutual trust is lacking for a broad counter-alliance; interstate competition prevails. A viable alternative to the US dollar as the global reserve currency remains lacking. The internal disintegration of US society, with declining life expectancy and living standards, has not led to a weakening of US imperialism over the past 20 years. This tipping point may have been reached at some point, but so far, it has not appeared imminent.