New Electoral Law, Meloni and Schlein's Summer Novel

Life under the beach umbrella, in the summer, is made of light chatter, we know, it is dominated by non-binding news, it is animated by topics that are not too divisive, and generally, when you can, when you try to disconnect, politics remains a background noise, a distant rustle, a wave that caresses a distant rock. Life under the beach umbrella, in politics, is a life made of light chatter, when you can, but the topic that will dominate the summer that we find ourselves facing, and that jumps out at us, as Lorenzo Jovanotti would say, is a topic that you will find little under the beach umbrellas you frequent, and little even on the pages of newspapers, but it is the most debated topic, by politics, outside and inside the parliamentary halls. You will think: of course, it's war! No way. You will add: of course, how could I not have thought of it before, it's rearmament! No way. You will say: of course, how foolish, it's the relationship with Trump! No, still off track. Under the umbrellas of politics, this summer, we will talk almost exclusively about a topic that is theoretically repulsive to all those who do not like politics but strategically crucial for all those who do politics.

Two words, don't faint: electoral law .

To try to make this story, this not very light but very summery novel , captivating, we will offer you three keys to reading it. First: a piece of news. Second: a simulation. Third: a problem. The news concerns the meat of the matter. There is talk of a new electoral law, but what electoral law are we talking about? A source close to the top of Palazzo Chigi confirmed the following game plan to Il Foglio. The new electoral law will eliminate single-member constituencies (i.e. constituencies where you elect only one deputy/senator: whoever gets one more vote wins the seat), will introduce a coalition bonus for parties that run together (which will kick in between 40 and 42 percent), will introduce a threshold for parties that run symmetrical to the one in the European elections (4 percent) and could also choose to use preferences (but who knows).

This is the meat, and the news, and the further point is that this law, even though it is also welcomed by the Democratic Party, is a law that will pass with the votes of the centre-right.

Second point: the simulation. You might say: but why does the center-right, which overwhelmingly won the elections with this electoral law, want to change the game plan? Simple and disconcerting answer. Because the center-right believes in the possibility of a broad field more than perhaps the center-left does. And because, on the basis of simple mathematical reasoning, rational but perhaps fallacious, it considers the current electoral law a risk for the future of the center-right. The issue is quickly explained. In 2022, the center-left chose to present itself divided at the polls. In this way, it gave the center-right the opportunity to win the elections thanks to the practically total conquest of single-member constituencies (in the Chamber 121 out of 147, in the Senate 56 out of 63) which allowed the center-right to become a majority in Parliament despite not being one in the country (the sum of the votes collected by the center-left parties in 2022 was roughly similar to that collected by the center-right parties). Today, however, the center-right is convinced – rightly – that the center-left will not make that mistake again (Meloni believes in the broad field more than a good part of the center-left electorate can believe in it) and with a compact center-left the distribution of constituencies with this electoral law might not be so advantageous (especially in the south, where the strength of the center-left in some regions could push the center-right to lose important seats, something that might not happen with a distribution of votes throughout Italy). And so, let there be a new law. With one more detail. Meloni also likes the new law because it would allow her allies to measure their real value after the elections and not before (it is one thing to distribute the constituencies, arguing, on the basis of the projection of discretionary polls, it is another to do it, not arguing, on the basis of an automatic mechanism, after the elections) and also because it would allow her to give some hope of representation to a possible center (which could also be useful in a future majority if there were allies who were too extremist). But the new electoral law would also please Schlein because it would introduce a “bipolar” mechanism that is appreciated by both the head of government and the opposition: the indication of the candidate for prime minister. Schlein wants it to be clear before the elections who will be the candidate for prime minister, in the center-left, and in this he has a precious ally in Matteo Renzi, while the rest of the coalition, and a good part of the Democratic Party, would like the indication to be only like today's: each party expresses its leader, then if the coalition wins well the leader of the first party should become prime minister, if the victory is not clear instead the waltz of negotiations begins, and who knows how it could end.

The third interesting element, which could also offer useful ideas for conversations other than those that take place under the umbrellas of politics, concerns an ineluctable trend in parliamentary life. And the question is simple. The history of Italian electoral laws over the last thirty years shows that no law has saved those who wanted it and shows that every time a government majority has tried to change the electoral law, the new electoral law has ultimately facilitated the victory of its opponents. In 2005, the Porcellum, wanted by the center-right, led to the victory of Romano Prodi's center-left. In 2017, the Rosatellum, wanted by the center-left, led to the victory of Giorgia Meloni's center-right. The illusion of shaping the system to one's own advantage has always been shattered by the variability of consensus, the fragility of leadership, and the unpredictability of voters. But the fact that despite this rule the center-right is gearing up to find a way to avoid losing the next elections reminds us that two years are a long time, that in two years a lot can change, that in two years consensus can change and that basically today the center-right believes in the possibility of a victory of the center-left more than the center-left itself does. The issue is there: no government, in the history of the Second Republic, has been reconfirmed, on the second go-round. But the question is also this: has a government in office ever found itself facing an opposition like the one that is running to lead Italy?

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