The thread that runs from the takeover bid to 5% defense spending

The day after tomorrow, when the Minister of Economy, Carlos Cuerpo, announces his decision on BBVA's takeover bid for Sabadell, Carlos Torres, the president of the Basque bank, will be able to assess whether announcing his operation three days before the crucial election day on which, after a long journey through the wilderness of more than thirteen years, the Socialists hoped to regain the presidency of the Generalitat for Salvador Illa, has had any consequences.

For the PSC and PSOE, it was the reward for a policy of normalization in relations with Catalonia implemented by Pedro Sánchez from the central government, first with pardons and then with amnesty, and thanks to which he was able to form a government after the last elections in July 2023. An objective so precious that it could well be worth a conviction for the operation.

The timing of the takeover bid, ignoring the political context, hopelessly politicized the bold financial assault that was being launched. The government's next decision will be both economic and political in nature, and the latter will allow us to accurately gauge the state of the government's mood after the deep moral and governability chasm opened by the Santos Cerdán affair . Logic suggests that Sánchez will try to finish the job and make it clear that he remains attentive to the demands of the Catalan political elite regarding the takeover bid. The answer will be on Tuesday.

A preliminary indicator, in this case not domestic but related to international relations, was the letter sent by the Prime Minister to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, informing him that Spain rules out increasing its defense spending to 5% of GDP, as proposed by that military organization. Strictly speaking, the proposal arrived before US President Donald Trump took office, and European partners have merely accepted it, almost servilely.

It doesn't sound like a letter from someone who's thrown in the towel and plans to leave the stage for a restroom exit. It's no joke to say no to the emperor so directly and explicitly.

An inextricable umbilical cord always connects national and international politics. What is done in one has a coherent counterpart in the other. Sánchez's political survival currently requires a firm rejection of the US and NATO militarist agenda. It is a necessary condition for the survival of the parliamentary majority on which the Sánchez government relies. It also requires pressure on his most reluctant left-wing partners. Even those on the right, Junts and PNV, may accept this course of action, which they do not particularly share, without considering it a red line to maintain their support and rule out any possibility of joining a possible vote of no confidence by the PP.

The debate over defense spending won't end with a letter to NATO; a tough battle lies ahead.

The problem is that the US isn't comfortable to face. The very speed with which most European allies have agreed to pay the price at the first opportunity indicates the extent to which they consider it convenient to align themselves with Trump and avoid trouble. Also, thinking that it might help them cheer up their ailing economies, military Keynesianism.

In the case of Spain, things are even more complicated. It is one of the countries most closely associated with the US after World War II; far from the level of Germany, obviously, but we must not forget that the survival of the Franco dictatorship was largely due to the alliance with our American friend. In this way, long before joining NATO, Spain was part of the global logistical and military deployment of the US army: the bases.

The United States engineered the integration of the Spanish economy into the global economy through the 1959 Stabilization Plan, mimeographed in the Washington offices of the State Department. Thanks to this program, designed for a world structured around US interests, the Spanish economy experienced its frantic growth during the 1960s and 1970s; it also explains many of the current flaws and limitations of the Spanish model.

Since then, the presence and influence of the United States have been very present in Spanish politics. The line pioneered by Francisco Franco, partially followed by Felipe González, took another spectacular leap forward with José María Aznar and his alignment with George W. Bush's Iraq war.

It is difficult to overstate the levers of influence and power of the United States in Spain.

It's difficult to overstate the levers of US intervention in Spain. From the training of senior military and intelligence officers to the presence of multinational corporations and the supply of weapons and defense systems. Opposing the US also augurs isolation in Europe.

And so it's hard to believe that the 5% issue can be settled with a simple letter to the NATO Secretary General. It's more reasonable to think that we're at the dawn of a dispute that begins with a discussion about military spending percentages and could jeopardize the government's foreign policy if more or less explicit and public means of agreement between the two sides aren't found.

For Sánchez, under the current political conditions in Spain, it is impossible to accept the NATO proposal. It would be tantamount to calling elections or resigning. To the extent that the PSOE Secretary General believes it makes sense, and has a reasonable chance, of remaining at the head of the government, he should rule out the arms program.

And in the process, he more clearly sculpts his profile as a politician who thrives on adversity and combat and who opposes the interests of the powerful.