Islam Özkan wrote: Sharia-Trump rapprochement and the test of the SDF

Syria is being reshaped under the intense attention of both regional and global actors during the transition process that began with the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. While the new Damascus administration, led by Ahmed Shara, has demonstrated a rapid recovery in diplomatic and economic spheres, tensions with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stand out as one of the most critical issues concerning the country's future. US support for Damascus's normalization efforts with Israel and the SDF's insistence on its demands for autonomy are creating confusion in Washington's relations with the SDF as it draws closer to Damascus. This situation undoubtedly marks a significant turning point in Syria's fragile transition. However, this process is not limited to the Damascus-SDF conflict; regional balances, international mediation, and Syria's internal dynamics are also among the determining factors.

The last six months have seen a dramatic acceleration in the Damascus government's efforts to rebuild its international legitimacy. Since January 2025, representatives from 78 foreign governments and multinational organizations have flocked to Damascus to meet with Sharjah and the transitional administration. This was a diplomatic surge unprecedented in modern history. With the lifting of more than 50 years of sanctions and its reintegration into regional and international institutions, Syria is experiencing a diplomatic renaissance. However, this renaissance and revitalization comes at a price: good relations with Israel, or "normalization." To this end, the US has even abandoned the idea of ​​foreign fighters leaving the country, which it had previously proposed as a pretext for lifting sanctions.

Damascus' efforts to normalize relations with Israel are also part of this process. In a March 2025 interview with The Economist, Sharaa stated that normalization with Israel was a sensitive issue but that public support was critical to this process. The alleged meeting with Israeli National Security Advisor Tzachi Hanegbi in Abu Dhabi in July 2025, and the secret Damascus-Tel Aviv contacts initiated through US mediation, indicate that these efforts are turning into concrete steps. A potential meeting between Sharaa and Netanyahu, planned for September 2025 before the UN General Assembly, could herald a security agreement under Trump's auspices. These steps demonstrate that Damascus is striving to play an active role not only in economic matters but also in regional security balances.

The US stands out as a key mediator and guarantor in Damascus's normalization process with Israel. This support is clearly demonstrated by a statement made to the New York Times in July 2025 by US Special Representative for Syria Thomas Barrack, who stated that Washington aimed to "restore calm" by establishing dialogue with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Damascus and that the Syrian government had held "meaningful talks" with Israel. Trump's claims that he offered normalization with Syria in exchange for Israel ending its war in Gaza reflect an attempt to balance US strategic interests in the region. These interests are primarily focused on limiting Iranian influence in the region, ensuring Syria's stability, and guaranteeing Israel's security.

Barrack, the US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Representative for Syria, said in an interview that the administration is trying to include Syria in the Abraham Accords, which established diplomatic relations between Israel and four Arab states during Trump's first term. However, Barrack warns that this process could take time due to resistance from Syria's new leader, Ahmed Sharaa, within his own public. "It cannot appear that Sharaa was forced or pressured into the Abraham Accords by his own people," he said. "That's why the process needs to move slowly."

According to the newspaper, much of Barrack's work focuses on helping Syria and Lebanon, recovering from devastating wars, address their own problems and garnering support from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other regional partners. It's unclear whether Trump's approach, which prioritizes economic development over explicit support for democracy, will be more successful than previous administrations' efforts to address the Middle East's most complex challenges.

The US approach to Damascus is evident not only in the context of normalization with Israel but also in Syria's overall transition. US plans to reopen its embassy in Damascus are part of Damascus's efforts to bolster its international legitimacy. However, during this process, the US's stance towards the SDF has taken a sharp turn. The SDF's insistence on autonomy contradicts Washington's "one state, one army" vision. Barrack's statement that "the only road is through Damascus" and his emphasis on the inappropriateness of federalism in the Syrian context indicate a clear US position in support of Damascus.

This position is reinforced by the new head of US Central Command, Bradley Cooper, emphasizing that Sharaa's continued presence in office is crucial to Syria's stability. Furthermore, the reduction in military funding to the SDF under Operation Resolve, largely directed to securing ISIS camps and prisons, suggests a decline in the SDF's strategic importance to the US. Trump's recent executive order, which transferred responsibility for these facilities to Damascus, has effectively deprived the SDF of one of its most important levers of international influence.

The SDF is facing increasing pressure from both the US and regional countries in its relations with Damascus. While the March 10 Agreement signed in March 2025 provided a framework for negotiations between Damascus and the SDF, recent meetings, such as the Damascus summit of July 9, 2025, have failed to produce any tangible progress. The SDF's demands to maintain its independent military structure, maintain a permanent presence in the northeast under the name "Syrian Democratic Forces," and preserve the institutional structure of the Autonomous Administration intact contradict Damascus's vision of "one state, one nation, one army, one government." These demands have disappointed Damascus and its mediators, the US and France.

There are numerous reports regarding the SDF's actions on the ground, but it's difficult to verify how much of it is true. The group's redeployment of heavy weapons northeast of Aleppo, in violation of the ceasefire agreement's disarmament clauses, extensive tunnel construction in Raqqa and Hasakah, and the detention of more than 100 Arab citizens (including women) in the last six months are all reports that require verification. The Autonomous Administration's decision to establish a "general administration" to operate Qamishli Airport on June 19th appears to have further strained relations with Damascus. All these steps suggest that the SDF believes reconciliation with Damascus is only possible if it does not contradict its principle of strengthening its own autonomous structure. So, will the SDF back down from its demands?

The SDF's insistence on its demands for autonomy could put it on an inevitable collision course with Damascus. Damascus's demand for a monopoly on the use of force and its stance that the SDF should be completely disbanded and integrated into the Syrian army further complicates the possibility of a compromise. Meanwhile, the SDF's request to extend the agreement deadline set at the Damascus summit for the end of 2025 can be seen as another indication that the likelihood of an agreement in the country in the near future is diminishing, and that if it does occur, it will likely take a longer time. However, both the US and regional countries appear impatient. While Barrack's August 2025 deadline for an agreement increases pressure on the SDF, the SDF also has its own trump cards, particularly regarding the ISIS issue, but the extent to which these will be effective remains to be seen.

The SDF's biggest disadvantage in this process is the time factor. The US's waning financial and military support, the transfer of ISIS camps and prisons to Damascus, and the growing backlash against the SDF by regional actors (especially Türkiye) are putting the SDF in an increasingly vulnerable position. Gulf states, particularly the Saudis, who previously supported the SDF but are now more aligned with Sharia, may withdraw their support from the organization.

Damascus's efforts to normalize relations with Israel could further marginalize the SDF's demands for autonomy. This is a possibility, but while Damascus may attempt to overcome existing difficulties by establishing relations with Israel, its intention to establish relations with Israel at the expense of the Syrian people could hit a wall. The UAE already plays a role as a bridge between Sharia and Israel, and there are strong suspicions that Türkiye supports this role and the process. Meanwhile, while Israel has made provocative statements against Sharia, these statements may actually be an attempt to disguise Israel's true intentions. Secret talks between the parties are ongoing. Israel's greatest desire is to use Syria as a counterweight to Iran. This situation, while providing Damascus with advantages, could also become a ticking time bomb for itself.

In summary, when looking at the overall process, it can be said that the situation is not encouraging for the SDF, and that the SDF has been dragged into a more disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Damascus, as the US has increasingly taken a closer stance towards Damascus.