Too high debts and harsh demands from America: what Germany can learn from Ludwig Erhard

What advice can one give the new federal government in Berlin? How should it act in and with Germany? And how should it not act? One could consult Ludwig Erhard. He commissioned a manuscript about his time as Chancellor from 1963 to 1966. The author was Johnny Klein, once Erhard's press officer, speechwriter, and ghostwriter. Klein later embarked on a successful political career himself: as a member of the Bundestag, as foreign policy spokesperson for the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, as a minister, and finally as Vice President of the Bundestag from 1990 until his death in 1996.

But why Ludwig Erhard again as an advisor from the past? Because he was the oft-quoted "father of the economic miracle"? It is a miracle that Germans today can only dream of. Examining his experiences as chancellor is of particular interest today. And it is commendable that these have now been published as a book. In the foreword to the edition, Roland Koch, Chairman of the Ludwig Erhard Foundation, attributes Erhard's continued modernity to the chancellor's conviction that the most important task of politics is to look to the future.

The questions of the future in the 1960s were not dissimilar to those of today. As both a policymaker and manager, Erhard faced many challenges that continue to shape the present: a lack of budgetary discipline, problems with the cohesion of the coalition, the question of burden-sharing in European-American relations, minor and major turning points, the situation in the Middle East, and friendship with Israel as a cornerstone of German foreign policy.

Against this backdrop, Erhard's memoirs of his chancellorship read like a report. Their editor, historian Ulrich Schlie, points out that Erhard never felt a strong inclination to comment on issues outside his area of ​​expertise, economic policy, and certainly not on international politics. Erhard actually intended to prioritize domestic policy during his chancellorship. However, it quickly became apparent that a changing global political landscape takes its toll, even on a German head of government.

Schlie's assessment highlights a number of déjà vu moments during Erhard's time as Chancellor. One is the still unresolved question of burden-sharing between Europeans and Americans within the North Atlantic Alliance. Even then, it was one of the most pressing foreign policy issues. And even then, the issue was the United States' high defense spending in Europe, amounting to $50 billion. The issue remained a constant in German-American relations during Erhard's reign – without tangible results.

As early as the 1960s, voices in Congress in Washington began to grow louder calling for a reduction in the US troop presence in Europe. However, it was the Democrats who exerted political pressure on their European allies at the time. Their parliamentary group leader, Mike Mansfield, first called for a drastic reduction in his country's troop presence in Europe in August 1966.

Another déjà vu is the still pressing question of Germany's nuclear participation within NATO's deterrence policy. In the first year of Erhard's chancellorship, the idea of ​​creating a multilateral nuclear force, the Multilateral Force (MLF), emerged in Washington. Several NATO submarines and warships would be equipped with nuclear missiles. These would then be under the joint command of the member states and would also guarantee participation for non-nuclear powers.

During his inaugural visit to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Erhard reaffirmed his willingness to participate in the MLF with Germany. French President Charles de Gaulle, however, rejected his country's participation, if only for reasons of prestige. Schlie points out that during a visit to Germany in 1964, de Gaulle approached Karl Carstens, then State Secretary of the Foreign Office and later Federal President, and confronted him with the proposal of a Franco-German collaboration in the nuclear field.

"Why do you attach so much importance to this project?" de Gaulle asked. "You surely don't believe the Americans will grant you any real influence in the MLF. Why don't you participate with us? With us, you can get a larger share." However, de Gaulle hadn't mentioned his "sensational offer" to Erhard.

The American-Russian détente, which is becoming increasingly apparent today, the cold shoulder that Ludwig Erhard repeatedly showed toward Paris, and the need for grandeur that defines French foreign and security policy—these set the external framework for Erhard's chancellorship: The failure of the MLF and France's withdrawal from NATO's military integration are later manifestations of this line. A line that continues into today's security policy discussions in Europe.

Ludwig Erhard: Experiences for the Future. My Time as Chancellor. Edited by Ulrich Schlie on behalf of the Ludwig Erhard Foundation. Econ-Verlag, Berlin 2024. 335 pp., CHF 31.90.