Tunay Şendal wrote: Kemalism phobia in the Kurdish issue

The reemergence of the Kurdish issue in a "new process," the PKK's decision to lay down its arms, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's subsequent rhetoric of Turkish-Kurdish-Arab unity have fueled discussions about redefining the nation-state model in Turkey. While this discourse aims to unite ethnic identities within an Islamist framework under a single, ummah-based identity, some intellectual circles have offered a critique of Kemalism, linking the root cause of the Kurdish issue to Kemalism's ethnic homogenization policies in light of discussions about the nation-state model. However, reducing the roots of the Kurdish issue solely to Kemalism both distorts historical reality and hinders the search for a solution. Turkey's progress toward resolving the Kurdish issue will be possible through a pluralistic and inclusive dialogue, free from ideological polarization.

Anatolia in the 1920s faced ethnic and religious diversity, as well as feudal structures, economic backwardness, and foreign intervention. In this context, Kemalism's nation-state model was shaped around a unifying concept of citizenship, paralleling Ernest Gellner's thesis of "the need for standardization and homogenization in the modernization process of nations. "

The claim of "ethnic homogenization," frequently made in criticisms of Kemalism, is an approach divorced from historical context. As Hans Kohn points out, the formation of nation-states was shaped by efforts to establish a common identity and political unity in the 19th and 20th centuries. In Türkiye, this process occurred amidst the throes of the transition from a multi-ethnic empire to a nation-state. Kemalism's concept of the "Turkish nation" aimed for political unity, in line with Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined communities, rather than an ethnic category. Therefore, reducing the Kurdish issue solely to Kemalist policies ignores both historical reality and the global evolution of the nation-state.

Attributing the roots of the problem solely to Kemalism is problematic for several reasons. First, this approach ignores the structural problems inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the influence of global powers in the region.

Secondly, it ignores the fact that the Kurdish identity movement from the 1960s onwards was shaped by an urban bourgeoisie and intellectual class. The Kurdish youth of the 1968 generation, nourished by socialist ideology, transitioned from a class-based understanding of struggle to an ethno-class-based movement; this was a reflection not of Kemalism but of global ideological currents.

Thirdly, this critique unilaterally places responsibility on the state by attributing the PKK's armed struggle in the 1980s and the resulting social trauma solely to state policies. This approach demonstrates a lack of intellectual sincerity.

Some intellectual circles are using criticism of Kemalism as leverage in the current political climate. Initiatives such as the "Kurdish initiative" launched by the AKP government in 2009 and the subsequent "resolution process" sought to bolster their own legitimacy by positioning Kemalism as an opposition figure. In this process, some intellectuals—consciously or unconsciously—provided intellectual cover for this political project. Presenting Kemalism as the root of the problem has both created a narrative that simplifies historical complexity and become a tool to support the current government's reformist rhetoric.

The roots of this phobia can be traced back to several distinct dynamics. First, after the 1980 coup, rising liberal and Islamist intellectual movements in Türkiye attempted to legitimize their alternative political arguments by branding Kemalism as an authoritarian ideology.

Secondly, the rise of postcolonial and identity politics at the global level has fuelled a backlash against the nation-state model, which has fuelled criticism of Kemalism in Türkiye.

Thirdly, instead of discussing the structural reforms necessary to resolve the Kurdish issue, some intellectuals have sought an easy way out by presenting Kemalism as a scapegoat. This is a triumph not of intellectual courage but of populist rhetoric.

Kemalismphobia also reveals a lack of self-criticism. A solution to the Kurdish issue requires not only criticizing the state's past policies, but also questioning the internal dynamics of the Kurdish movement and the social costs posed by the PKK. However, this phobia places the entire burden of the problem on Kemalism, obscuring the responsibilities of other actors. This situation can be described as intellectual blindness, as a true solution requires sincere self-criticism from all parties.

The roots of the Kurdish issue lie not only in an ideological framework but also in historical, sociological, and economic dynamics. As Charles Tilly emphasized the "force, capital, and legitimacy" triangle in state formation, nation-state building in Türkiye was shaped by feudal structures inherited from the Ottoman Empire, regional inequalities, and the interventions of external actors. In this context, the Kurdish issue must be explained not only by Kemalist policies but also by multilayered factors such as center-periphery tensions, tribal structures, and economic backwardness within the Ottoman Empire.

To understand the roots of the Kurdish issue, it is crucial to examine the early Kurdish rebellions within the Ottoman Empire and the influence of external actors. In the 19th century, Ottoman centralization policies threatened the autonomy of local authorities, creating unrest among Kurdish tribal leaders. For example, the Baban Rebellion of 1806 arose as a reaction to Ottoman tax reforms and the weakening of local administrations. Similarly, the Bedirhan Bey Rebellion of the 1840s was shaped by resistance to Ottoman efforts to directly control tribal structures. These rebellions centered around the defense of local authority and economic interests rather than ethnic identity.

In the post-World War I period, the dynamics of the Kurdish issue became more complex due to the intervention of external actors. The British, in particular, attempted to manipulate the Kurds in line with their own geopolitical interests during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Kurdish Teali Society, founded in 1918, operated with British support. The society aimed to strengthen national consciousness among the Kurds while simultaneously promoting the idea of establishing a Kurdish state under British mandate.

The British promise of an autonomous structure in the Kurdish regions within the framework of the Treaty of Sèvres impressed local leaders, but these promises were later not implemented. As Hans Kohn points out, this British policy exemplifies the strategy of foreign powers to protect their own interests by manipulating local groups during the decline of empires.

So, instead of the nation-state model derived from Kemalism, which is claimed to have laid the groundwork for the formation of the Kurdish issue, can the discourse of Turkish-Kurdish-Arab unity advocated by President Erdoğan offer a solution to the problem under an Islamist framework?

Rather than an Ottomanist vision, this discourse aims to redefine the identity of the nation-state by emphasizing the unifying power of Islam. While the Ottoman Empire's multi-ethnic structure envisioned the coexistence of different nations within a hierarchical order, Islamist discourse minimized ethnic differences and aimed to create a shared sense of belonging based on the ummah (Sunni sect) instead of the nation-state model—a perspective that is historically risky.

The risks of a social order based on the Ummah or sect are clearly illustrated through historical examples. Amin Maalouf's work, The Decline of Civilizations , provides a striking account of the civil war and social collapse Lebanon experienced due to sectarian divisions. Maalouf emphasizes that sectarian tensions between the Christian, Muslim, and Druze communities in Lebanon led to the weakening of the nation-state structure and ultimately its collapse. Similarly, Mark Mazower's work, Salonica, City of Ghosts , argues that Thessaloniki's ethnic and religious diversity became a source of conflict in the post-Ottoman era. Religious and ethnic tensions between the Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities in Thessaloniki, combined with the lack of a modern nation-state structure, led to a loss of social harmony.

The devastating effects of sectarian divisions in the Middle East have also been observed recently. Fawaz A. Gerges's ISIS: A History argues that sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Syria paved the way for the emergence of radical organizations like ISIS. By deepening the Sunni-Shia divide, ISIS accelerated the collapse of nation-state structures and increased regional instability. Eugene Rogan's The Arabs: A History emphasizes that sectarian identities in the Arab world hinder nation-state building and make it vulnerable to external intervention. William Dalrymple's From the Holy Mountain argues that Christian communities in the Middle East have been marginalized by sectarian tensions, destabilizing the region. Similarly, Tim Mackintosh-Smith's Arabs: A 3,000-Year History emphasizes that the ideal of ummah (ummah) in the Islamic world has historically been overshadowed by sectarian conflict. These historical examples have demonstrated that an ummah-based model fails to ensure social integration due to sectarian divisions.

The nation-state, a model suited to Türkiye's historical and social realities, united diverse identities under a common citizenship. Its dismantling could deepen social polarization and plunge Türkiye into a chaos akin to the sectarian conflicts in the Middle East.

In conclusion, Erdoğan's discourse on Turkish-Kurdish-Arab unity, with its vision of a "Turkish Century," aims to redefine the nation-state model through an Islamist perspective. However, historical examples have demonstrated the failure of ummah- or sectarian-based models to achieve social cohesion. Amin Maalouf's example of Lebanon, Mark Mazower's narrative of Thessaloniki, and Fawaz Gerges's analysis of ISIS have clearly demonstrated the destructive effects of sectarian divisions. The nation-state model remains the most appropriate framework for managing Türkiye's ethnic and religious diversity.

To conclude with a quote from Maalouf: “If you divide the country into communities and nations, then each one will look for a regional and global ally. This was not the Lebanese nation project. It was necessary to ensure that people belonged not only to their own communities but primarily to the Lebanese nation.”